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Abstract This study examines the effect of two potential sources of ethical principles on
earnings quality: corporate social responsibility (CSR) and membership in a Shariah index. We
define membership in a Shariah index as the adherence to an ethical code that relates to Islam.
Our sample comprises firms in ten European Union countries for the period from 2003 to 2013.
The empirical results show that firms with a high degree of CSR are less likely to manage
earnings. In contrast, membership in a Shariah index leads to earnings manipulation. Our results
are robust after using several alternative quality metrics for earnings. Furthermore, our empir-
ical results indicate that highly rated CSR firms that are not Shariah-compliant are less likely to
engage in earnings manipulation. Further, institutional factors are also important in determining
the link between CSR, Shariah-compliance, and the quality of financial reporting.
Keywords Corporate social responsibility . Shariah-compliant investments . Earnings quality
JEL Classifications G30 .M14 .M41
1 Introduction
Ethics and financial reporting are both topical issues that have instigated numerous debates in
the academic as well as the business community (Schwartz 2004). In this study, we assess the
effect of two potential sources of ethical principles, namely, CSR and membership in a Shariah
index. The literature has defined CSR in various ways but in essence, it is a process by which
organizations negotiate their roles within the surrounding society (Carroll 1979; McWilliams
et al. 2006). Membership in a Shariah index is the adherence to an ethical code that relates to
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religion. The literature has also proposed this membership as another possible driver of moral
activities (Weaver and Agle 2002; Conroy and Emerson 2004; Longenecker et al. 2004; Hood
et al. 2014). In particular, Noreen (1988) contends that agency contracts with a religious
mechanism can mitigate managers’ opportunistic behavior. Hence, we also focus on the
relation between Shariah-compliant investment and the quality of financial reporting.1
This study develops the theoretical link between ethics and financial reporting by using two
competing views: moral obligation and opportunistic behavior (Kim et al. 2012). First, firms
benefit from conducting their business activities in a way that is honest, trustworthy, and ethical.
Thus, firms have a tendency to comply with high moral standards (Jones 1995; Garriga and Melé
2004; Kim et al. 2012). In a similar vein, Kim et al. (2012) contend that firms that expend efforts
and resources in designing and implementing ethical programs in order to serve the interests of
societal stakeholders are more likely to provide transparent and reliable earnings information.
However, managers might have an incentive to use ethical precepts as a strategic tool to obfuscate
their opportunistic behavior, and in so doing, they can attempt to influence stakeholders’ percep-
tions of the firm (Hemingway andMaclagan 2004;Merkl-Davies andBrennan 2011). Thus, a firm
might use an ethical practice as a label to create the perception of transparency, thereby avoiding
scrutiny from stakeholders. The practice therefore assists firms in legitimizing their operations
within society (Merkl-Davies and Brennan 2007). Thus far, the studies that examine the associ-
ation between ethics and earnings quality provide mixed empirical results. With regard to CSR
reporting, Prior et al. (2008) and Chih et al. (2008) both find that CSR firms are more likely to
engage in aggressive earnings manipulation. However, Hong and Andersen (2011) and Kim et al.
(2012) show that firms with higher CSR scores provide better quality information on earnings. In
the case of religion and the quality of financial reporting, McGuire et al. (2011) and Dyreng et al.
(2012) both show that religion-influenced firms are less involved in aggressive financial reporting
and have higher accrual quality, lower restatements of financial statements, lower risk of fraudulent
accounting, and lower forecast errors. In contrast, Callen et al. (2011) show that the extent of
earnings management is not related to religion. Given that most of the research focuses almost
exclusively on either CSR ormembership in a Shariah index, this study examines the effect of both
sources of ethical principles on the quality of financial reporting. Furthermore, whereas the
literature that examines the link between Shariah and financial issues concentrates almost exclu-
sively on Muslim countries, this study shifts the focus to rest of the world because Shariah-
compliant investment has experienced considerable growth in recent years.
Using a large data set of firms domiciled in ten European Union countries for the period
from 2003 to 2013, our main empirical results show that firms engaging in CSR activities are
less likely to manipulate earnings. In contrast, membership in a Shariah index does not play an
important role in influencing the ethical conduct of a firm. This is because the membership of a
firm in the index does not act as a proxy for religion. Membership basically means that the firm
does not do anything prohibited by Islam. In other words, the Shariah index can include firms
that adhere to some form of ethical code. However, this membership might or might not be for
religion reasons.2 Our results are robust when using alternative earnings quality metrics.
Furthermore, our empirical results show that only firms with high CSR ratings are serious
1 Shariah-compliant investment is a growing phenomenon in both Muslim and non-Muslim countries, and it is
structured within Islamic parameters, whereby a firm is expected not only to operate in accordance with the law
and regulations of a given jurisdiction, but also to seek to achieve both the pleasure of God and the optimisation
of social welfare (Hayat and Kraeussl 2011; Abdelsalam et al. 2015; Mollah et al. 2016).
2 These criteria are related to the principle of permissibility (Arabic: Ibā ah) highlighted in the realm of Islamic
commercial transactions (see Kamali 2002). We are grateful to the editor Haluk Ünal for pointing this out to us.
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adopters of ethical codes, whereas firms that have a high CSR rating and are Shariah-
compliant are more likely to use ethical codes as a label to garner a good perception in order
to attract investments. Further, firms’ home-country characteristics are also important in
determining the link between CSR, Shariah-compliance, and the quality of financial reporting.
This study contributes to the literature in several ways. First, we add to the limited number of
studies that examine the link between ethics and the quality of financial reporting. Second, unlike
the literature that focuses either on CSR or on the membership in a Shariah index, we examine
both ethical principles as potential drivers of the quality of financial reporting. In doing so, we
identify whether the firms’ ethical practices are based on moral obligations or are used as a label
to meet stakeholders’ demands. Third, the literature focuses almost exclusively on a single type of
country, whereas our empirical analysis is more comprehensive, covering a sample of firms in
different countries. And, our study provides a better understanding of corporate financial
reporting practices in relation to the behavior, religious ethical values, and CSR that might be
of interest to standard setters, regulatory bodies, investors, and academics. We also assist various
stakeholders in understanding how reliable and transparent financial reporting is in light of the
relation between Islamic principles, CSR, and the quality of financial reporting.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: the next section reviews the literature
and develops the hypotheses. We discuss the research design, measurement of variables, and
empirical models in section 3. We present the main results in section 4 and additional analyses
in section 5. Section 6 offers concluding remarks.
2 Theory and hypotheses development
2.1 Corporate social responsibility and earnings quality
Friedman (1970, p. 173) argues that the aim of firms’ corporate social responsibility is
Bto conduct the business in accordance with their [shareholders’] desires, which gener-
ally will be to make as much money as possible while conforming to the basic rules of
society, both those embodied in law and those embodied in ethical custom.^ In Carroll’s
(1991) view, CSR firms operate toward profitable activities, conduct these activities
within the legal framework and ethical principles, and aim to be good corporate citizens.
Kim et al. (2012) argue that the conflicting incentives of moral obligation and opportunistic
behavior underlie the managerial engagement in CSR activities. The theoretical frameworks
based on the moral obligation perspective show that firms in fact benefit from conducting their
business activities in a way that is honest, trustworthy, and ethical. Therefore, the firms have a
tendency to comply with high moral and ethical standards (Jones 1995; Garriga and Melé 2004;
Kim et al. 2012).3 The stakeholder theory and the myopia avoidance hypothesis argue that CSR
firms pay more attention to the strategy of building a long-term relationship with stakeholders
than to the strategy of short-term profit maximization (Chih et al. 2008). Further, the integrative
theory argues that firms must take into account social demands in their decisions because their
success is reliant on society. Furthermore, managers’ level of ethical reasoning and firms’ moral
obligation can lead to a general tendency for managers to conduct business operations in the
3 Carroll (1979), for instance, proposes a CSR model based on four categories that society expects corporations
to cover: economic, legal, ethical, and discretionary. Similarly, Garriga and Melé (2004) propose four theories of
CSR, namely, instrumental, political, integrative, and ethical.
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interests of stakeholders rather than their self-interest (Rutledge and Karim 1999; Booth and
Schulz 2004). Similarly, CSR can act as an effective quasi-governance mechanism in
constraining the opportunistic behavior of managers (Gao et al. 2014). Empirically, using a data
set of nonfinancial US firms in the period from 1995 to 2005, Hong andAndersen (2011) find that
firms that engage in CSR activities are more likely to have higher quality financial reporting. In
particular, their results show that CSR is positively associated with quality accruals and
negatively associated with real earnings management. Similarly, Kim et al. (2012) find that firms
with a high CSR score are less likely to use discretionary accruals or manipulate real activities in
order to manage earnings. Using earnings smoothing or earnings loss avoidance as proxies for
earnings management, Chih et al. (2008) also show a negative association between CSR and
earnings management. Taken together, if the underlying incentive in CSR activities is to be
truthful, transparent, and ethical in corporate dealings; then firms should bemore likely to provide
high quality earnings information. Hence, we expect that engagement in CSR activities has a
favorable effect on the quality of financial reporting. Accordingly, we hypothesize that:
Hypothesis 1a: Engagement in CSR is positively associated with the degree of earnings
quality.
In contrast, from the opportunistic behavior perspective, managers use CSR as a strategic
tool to satisfy stakeholders’ demands and to influence how they perceive the future of the firm.
Thus, the managers use CSR to distract attention from any manipulation of the financial
reporting (Prior et al. 2008) and as a mechanism to pursue their own self-interests (Fritzsche
1991; Hemingway and Maclagan 2004; McWilliams et al. 2006; Petrovits 2006). In particular,
the research argues that three economic channels of CSR engagement are strategically
valuable: (i) as a signal of a product’s market quality, (ii) as a way of giving back that makes
shareholders feel good; and (iii) as a halo effect (Benabou and Tirole 2010; Hong and
Liskovich 2015).4 In a similar vein, Kim et al. (2012) argue firms can use CSR to create the
perception of transparency among stakeholders to legitimize their activities and gain
stakeholder support when in fact they are engaging in earnings manipulation. Empirically,
using a data set of 593 firms in 26 countries between 2002 and 2004, Prior et al. (2008) find a
positive relation between CSR and earnings management. This finding shows that firms use
CSR as an entrenchment tool to obfuscate poor earnings quality. Similarly, Chih et al. (2008)
find a positive relation between CSR and aggressive earnings management. In summary, if
managerial opportunistic behavior motivates CSR engagement to influence stakeholders’
perceptions, then we predict that CSR engagement has an unfavorable effect on the quality
of financial reporting. Hence, we propose the following:
Hypothesis 1b: Engagement in CSR is negatively associated with the degree of earnings
quality.
2.2 Membership in a Shariah index and earnings quality
Another source of moral principles that might influence corporate activities as well as financial
reporting is membership in a Shariah index. In order to be Shariah-compliant, Muslim scholars
4 We thank an anonymous reviewer for highlighting this dimension of CSR.
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have introduced a screening process that firm must undergo to detect any activities that are
unacceptable to the Shariah (Čihák and Hesse 2010; Aysan et al. 2016; Pappas et al. 2016;). A
board called the Shariah Supervisory Board usually conducts this screening process. Firms
have been designing Shariah-compliant investments at a rapidly growing rate in recent years.
These investments have estimated assets of USD 1033 billion and are in more than 800
managed Islamic funds (Hayat and Kraeussl 2011).5 Similar to CSR, Shariah principles assert
that the firm should carry out business activities in a transparent manner, with every aspect of
these activities clarified for various stakeholders (Ali and Al-Owaihan 2008).6 Shariah com-
pliance thereby provides investors with reliable and relevant information that enables them to
make investment decisions in terms of both their economic and their religious position
(Haniffa and Hudaib 2002). Empirically, McGuire et al. (2011) and Dyreng et al. (2012) both
find that religion-influenced firms are less involved in aggressive financial reporting and have
higher quality accruals, lower restatements of financial statements, lower risk of fraudulent
accounting, and lower forecast errors. Similarly, the research shows that religion has
considerable effects on restraining unethical behaviors. In particular, Hamdi and Zarai
(2013) report that executives employed in Islamic financial institutions are less likely to
engage in earnings management. Shariah-compliant firms are also subject to greater scrutiny
from external institutions and investors to ensure that their business conduct is within Shariah
principles. In sum, we argue that Shariah-compliant firms face greater demands to conduct
ethical activities and to provide transparent and reliable financial reporting. Accordingly, we
expect membership in a Shariah index to have a positive effect on the quality of financial
reporting. Hence, we propose:
Hypothesis 2a:Membership in a Shariah index is positively associated with the degree of
earnings quality.
Nevertheless, the current Shariah screening process might not fully conform to the
true spirit of Islam (El-Gamal 2006). The process might only concentrate on negative
aspects of business activities by ensuring that Shariah-compliant firms are not engaging
in prohibited activities.7 In addition, the Shariah screening process basically tilts a
portfolio toward growth stocks to the exclusion of value stocks. This tilt leads to a style
5 Beekun and Badawi (2005) argue that the growth in Islamic-based investment is due to (i) the growing number
of affluent investors based in Muslim countries; (ii) the move towards a greater Islamic trading bloc by a number
of Islamic countries; (iii) the immigration of a large number of Muslims across the world; and (iv) a greater need
for investment diversity, including investment based on religion, as a result of globalization.
6 Consistent with the Islamic accountability perspective, managers should safeguard investors’ investments
because of the trust between them, and, in doing so, conduct business activities in an ethical and transparent
manner along the principles of equity, justice, and benevolence (Hassan and Harahap 2010).
7 The screening process considers two aspects, business compliance and financial ratios, in order to determine the
negative aspects of business activities (see Ashraf 2015). The compliance screening process relates to both firms’
main activities and their revenue allocation. That is, a firm should not engage in prohibited activities such as
conventional finance (whose activities are interest-based); alcohol; weapons; arms and defence manufacturing;
tobacco; non-halal food production, such as pork-related products; or the entertainment business, such as casinos
and gambling (FTSE Group 2011). A firm that belongs to legitimate industries is also examined in terms of its
revenue allocation. For instance, if a firm has a business in a non-halal activity, this is also considered
inappropriate according to Shariah principles. In addition, even when a firm’s activities are acceptable but it
engages in trade debt either as a borrower or lender, this is deemed unacceptable. Examination of financial ratios
– the second part of the Shariah screening process – is aimed at detecting non-Shariah compliant financing and
earnings. The financial ratio screening concentrates on a firm’s leverage, liquidity, interest, and non-permissible
income.
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bias that affects the long-term performance of the portfolio (see Hoepner et al. 2011).
That is, in the long run the Shariah-inclined portfolio (or a growth-oriented one) will lag
behind the overall market (see Malkiel 2003). Moreover, Cho et al. (2012) find that
membership in an ethical index is far more affected by what firms say (ethical disclosure)
than by what they actually do (ethical performance). Similarly, the decision to include
firms in the Shariah index is extensively, if not purely, based on what firms disclose
regarding their business activities and financial structure, with no effort to track Shariah
performance across time.
In terms of both the legitimacy and the institutional theory, a number of external factors might
affect the decision to engage in ethical practices such as Shariah-compliance, including a firm’s
financial and competitive situation, state, regulation body, and pressure groups (Bansal and Roth
2000; Christmann 2000; González‐Benito and González‐Benito 2006; Campbell 2007; Delmas
and Toffel 2010). In particular, economic factors might plausibly motivate a firm’s decision to
seek inclusion in the Shariah-compliant index. The motivation might be to attract investment
from Islamic investors and not because the firm wishes to abide by moral and ethical principles.
Furthermore, inclusion in the Shariah-compliant index results from firms satisfying the screening
requirements rather than from a conscious decision to conduct business in a Shariah-compliant
manner. Specifically, inclusion in such an index could merely mean that firms do not do anything
prohibited under Shariah law.8 Empirically, using country-level data, Callen et al. (2011) find that
the propensity to manage earnings is not related to religion. Hence, on the basis of this argument,
we expect that membership in a Shariah index has a negative effect on the quality of financial
reporting. Accordingly, our alternative hypothesis is as follows:
Hypothesis 2b:Membership in a Shariah index is negatively associated with the degree of
earnings quality.
3 Research design
3.1 The data
We construct the sample by using the Thomson Reuters Asset4 (ASSET4) database that covers
ten European Union countries for the period from 2003 to 2013. These countries are Belgium,
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, and the United
Kingdom. The degree of CSR engagement is measured by using the environmental and social
performance scores in the Thomson Reuters ASSET4 database. This database collates 900
evaluation points for each firm based on data that must be objective and available to the public.
The evaluation points are classified either as drivers or outcomes. While drivers assess firms’
policies concerning the issues relating to human rights, emissions reduction, and shareholder
rights, the outcomes evaluate quantitative results such as the remuneration package, personnel
turnover, and green-house gas emissions. These drivers and outcomes are then used as inputs
in a default equal-weighted framework to calculate 250 key performance indicators (KPIs).
Further, the 250 KIPs are organized into 18 categories within four pillars: (i) economic
performance scores, (ii) environmental performance scores, (iii) social performance scores,
8 For instance, major energy firms are included in international Shariah indexes due to the fact that their operating
activities are permissible under the Shariah law but not for religious reasons.
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and (iv) corporate governance performance scores (see Appendix A for details of the pillars
and categories). For our empirical analysis, following Cheng et al. (2012), we calculate the
CSR engagement by using the equally weighted average of the annual performance scores of
the environmental and social pillars.
Accounting items are sourced from the Worldscope and Datastream databases. After
matching the CSR data with the accounting data, our initial sample is 6,840 firm-year
observations. Consistent with prior studies (Hong and Andersen 2011; Kim et al. 2012;
Scholtens and Kang 2012), financial firms are excluded because of the unique nature of their
reporting practices (N = 1,458 firm-years).9 In addition, firms with missing data are omitted
from the sample (N = 1,441 firm-years). We also exclude the firm-years with extreme values or
insufficient information to determine the earnings quality (N = 312 firm-years). Thus, the final
sample of the study comprises 4,781 firm-year observations. Table 1 shows the distribution of
all of the firm-year observations across countries and sectors of operations. Panel A of Table 1
indicates that the highest percentage of observations is from the United Kingdom (43.69%)
followed by France (12.28%) and Germany (11.11%). Across the sectors of operation, Panel B
of Table 1 shows that the Industrials sector represents the largest proportion in the sample,
(29.20%) followed by Consumer Services (21.79%) and Consumer Goods (13.64%).
The data set for Shariah-compliant firms is sourced from the FTSE Shariah Europe
Index.10 A firm is classified as Shariah-compliant (non-Shariah-compliant) if it is
included in (excluded from) the index.11 As Table 1 shows, Shariah-compliant firms
represent 29.66% (N = 1,418 firm-years) and the remaining 70.34% (N = 3363 firm-
years) of the sample are non-Shariah-compliant.
3.2 Measuring earnings quality
A number of approaches are used in the literature to estimate earnings quality. In this study, we
use the discretionary accruals as a proxy for earnings quality. The literature has used this
measure of earnings quality extensively (Jones 1991; Dechow et al. 1995; DeFond and
Subramanyam 1998; Kothari et al. 2005; Mouselli et al. 2012). Discretionary accruals are
estimated using the modified Jones model adjusted for performance (Dechow et al. 1995;
Kothari et al. 2005). The literature discusses the strengths and drawbacks of this model (Guy
et al. 1996; Young 1999; Thomas and Zhang 2001; Lo 2008; Dechow et al. 2010; DeFond
2010). Despite its shortcomings, there is no alternative model that has a superior solution to
address the issue of estimating discretionary accruals (Botsari and Meeks 2008).
This study uses the cross-sectional approach to the modified Jones model instead of
the firm-specific time-series approach. Bartov et al. (2000) report better performance
from the cross-sectional approach in detecting earnings manipulations. Furthermore, the
cross-sectional approach assists in maximizing the sample size and mitigating the issue
9 For earnings quality in financial firms, see e.g. Leventis et al. (2011).
10 Following the literature (Ashraf 2015; Girard and Hassan 2008), we use the FTSE Shariah Europe Index due
to its broad coverage, consistency, and reliability. In term of the representativeness, as of 2015, the FTSE Shariah
Europe Index has more than 300Shariah-compliant constituents with a market capitalization of over USD 4
trillion dollars (FTSE, 2015).
11 Given that our sample is constructed from ASSET4, firms included in the sample may not be screened by
FTSE to determine their Shariah status. Hence, empirical analysis between CSR firms and Shariah firms could be
overstated. To resolve this issue, we make sure that all sample firms are also included in the FTSE All-World
index, as firms included in this index are eligible for the FTSE Shariah Index screening. This ensures that all
firms are screened by the Shariah process in order to determine whether they are Shariah-compliant or not.
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of survivorship bias that occurs with the time-series model (DeFond and Subramanyam
1998, 1998; Peasnell et al. 2005; Dargenidou et al. 2014). In addition, Subramanyam
(1996) shows that the cross-sectional model provides more accurate parameter estimates
than the time-series one because of the larger number of freedom degrees. Following
Teoh et al. (1998), this study focuses on the current discretionary accruals rather than the
total discretionary accruals.12
When estimating the current discretionary accruals, we first compute the total current
accruals (TCAit) for firm i at year t as follows:
TCAit ¼ ΔCAit−ΔCashitð Þ− ΔCLit−ΔSTDebtitð Þ ð1Þ
where ΔCAit is the change in current assets, ΔCashit is the change in cash and the cash
equivalent, ΔCLit is the change in current liabilities, and ΔSTDebtit is the change in short-
12 Becker et al. (1998) contend that, on average, managers have greater discretion over current accruals than over
total accruals.
Table 1 Sample distribution. The CSR firms are the full sample based on the Thomson Reuters ASSET4
database. CSR Shariah-compliant firms are the firms included in both the Thomson Reuters ASSET4 database
and the FTSE Shariah Europe Index. CSR non-Shariah-compliant firms are firms included in the Thomson
Reuters ASSET4 database, but not in the FTSE Shariah Europe Index
CSR firms (full
sample)
CSR Shariah-compliant
firms
CSR Non-Shariah-compliant
firms
N % N % N %
Panel A: Country of Domicile
Belgium 144 3.01 51 3.60 93 2.77
Denmark 179 3.74 59 4.16 120 3.57
Finland 229 4.79 93 6.56 136 4.04
France 587 12.28 270 19.04 317 9.43
Germany 531 11.11 220 15.51 311 9.25
Italy 266 5.56 74 5.22 192 5.71
Netherlands 222 4.64 79 5.57 143 4.25
Spain 284 5.94 56 3.95 228 6.78
Sweden 250 5.23 92 6.49 158 4.70
United Kingdom 2089 43.69 424 29.90 1665 49.51
Total 4781 100.00 1418 100.00 3363 100.00
Panel B: Sector of Operations
Oil and gas 332 6.94 145 10.23 187 5.56
Basic materials 424 8.87 261 18.41 163 4.85
Industrials 1396 29.20 332 23.41 1064 31.64
Consumer goods 652 13.64 156 11.00 496 14.75
Health care 294 6.15 108 7.62 186 5.53
Consumer services 1042 21.79 186 13.12 856 25.45
Telecommunications 138 2.89 49 3.46 89 2.65
Utilities 256 5.35 92 6.49 164 4.88
Technology 247 5.17 89 6.28 158 4.70
Total 4781 100.00 1418 100.00 3363 100.00
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term debt. Second, we run the following regression using an ordinary least squares for all
sample firms in each industry for which at least ten observations are available in year t:
TCAit
TAit−1
¼ α0 1TAit−1
 
þ α1 ΔREV it−ΔRECitTAit−1
 
þ α2 EARNit−1TAit−1
 
þ εit ð2Þ
where TCAit is the total current accruals for firm i at year t, ΔREV it is the change in net
revenues in year t from year t-1,ΔRECit is the change in net receivables in year t from year t-1,
EARNit1 is the income before extraordinary items for firm i at year t-1. We deflate each
variable by the lagged value of firm i’s total assets (TAit1) to correct for heteroscedasticity.
Third, we calculate the non-discretionary (NDACi,t) component of its total current accruals
for each firm by using the industry- and year-specific estimates of α0; α1, and α2 as follows:
NDACi;t ¼ α^0 1TAit−1
 
þ α^1 ΔREV it−ΔRECitTAit−1
 
þ α^2 EARNit−1TAit−1
 
ð3Þ
Fourth, the current discretionary accruals (DACi;tÞ component for each firm i and year t is
computed by subtracting the non-discretionary portion (NDACi;tÞ from the total current
accruals TCAitð Þ:
DACi;t ¼ TCAitTAit−1 − NDACi;t ð4Þ
In this study, we use both the absolute and the signed value of the current discretion-
ary accruals as a proxy for earnings quality. That is, the absolute (EQ1), positive (EQ1+
), and negative (EQ1-) values of the current discretionary accruals are considered in the
empirical analysis as proxies for the combined effect and the income-increasing or
income-decreasing earnings management, respectively (Warfield et al. 1995; DeFond
and Park 1997; Klein 2002; Sun et al. 2010; Kim et al. 2012). Ceteris paribus, in the case
of the combined effect, the higher the absolute value of the discretionary accruals the
higher the degree of earnings management is, hence the lower the earnings quality
(EQ1). For the signed value, the higher (lower) the positive (negative) value of the
discretionary accruals the higher the degree of earnings management is, hence the lower
the earnings quality (EQ1+ and EQ1-).
3.3 Empirical models
The first aim of the study is to examine the relation between CSR and earnings quality. In
examining our first hypothesis, we estimate the following model:
EQ ¼ α0 þ β1CSRit þ
X7
k¼1
βkControlsit þ εt ð5Þ
where EQ is either EQ1, EQ1+, or EQ1-. The CSR is the equally weighted average annual
performance score of ASSET4’s environmental and the social pillars. A number of
variables are included in the regression model in order to control for the firms’ charac-
teristics that could affect the extent of the CSR and earnings quality. Following Kim
et al. (2012), we include corporate governance (CG) in our model because CG is a
distinct construct from CSR, and both have an influence on the firms’ behavior. We use
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the scores of ASSET4’s corporate governance pillar to control for the effect of CG. Other
firm-specific control variables include the firms’ size (SIZE), which is the natural
logarithm of the market value of the equity; market-to-book equity ratio (MB), measured
as the market value of equity divided by the book value of equity; profitability (ROA),
measured as income before extraordinary items divided by total assets; leverage (LEV),
calculated as long-term debt scaled by total assets; ownership concentration (CLOSE)
that is the percentage of closely held shares as reported by Worldscope, and the Big 4
auditors (Auditors) that equals one if a firm is audited by a Big 4 auditor and zero
otherwise. For ease of reading, we summarize the variable definitions in Appendix B.
The second aim of this study is to assess the effect of membership in a Shariah index on
earnings quality. The following model is estimated to examine our hypothesis:
EQ ¼ α0 þ β1CSRit þ β2Shariahit þ
X7
k¼1
βkControlsþ εt ð6Þ
where Shariah is an indicator variable that equals one if the firm is in the FTSE Shariah Europe
Index, and zero otherwise. We use the same control variables as in Eq. 3.
Industry and country fixed effects are included in all of the regressions to account for
variations across industries and countries. In addition, we control for the year fixed effect to
account for annual changes in the CSR and earnings quality. All continuous variables are
truncated at the 1 and 99% levels to mitigate the influence of outliers. Further, all test statistics
and significance levels are estimated with firm and year level clustered errors.13
4 Main results
4.1 Descriptive statistics
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics for the full sample. Panel A shows that the
mean of EQ1 is 0.120.14 The CSR and CG scores both range between zero and one, and
they have a mean of 0.679 and 0.590, respectively. As for the control variables, the mean
values of MB and ROA are 3.190 and 0.056, respectively, and they indicate that the firms
in our sample experience high growth opportunities. On average, insider investors hold
26% of the outstanding shares. Panel B of Table 2 shows that one of the Big 4 audit
93.58% (N = 4474) of the firms in the sample. Furthermore, 29.66% of our sample firms
(N = 1418) are CSR firms included in the FTSE Shariah Europe Index, and the remaining
70.87% (N = 2572) are CSR firms that are not Shariah-compliant.
Panels C and D of Table 2 provide the descriptive statistics for the subsample of CSR
firms that are Shariah-compliant and the subsample of CSR firms that are not Shariah-
compliant. We define CSR and Shariah-compliant firms as firms that are included in the
FTSE Shariah Europe Index and vice versa for the CSR and non-Shariah-compliant firms.
The mean values of EQ1 and EQ1+ are higher for CSR and Shariah-compliant firms
13 We also ran the regression model with firm-level clustered errors only at the firm and the year level. The results
are qualitatively similar to those based on the regression model adjusted for standard errors by a two-dimensional
cluster at the firm and the year level. For brevity, we do not tabulate the results using these regression models.
14 In untabulated results, the unsigned discretionary accruals (DA) have a mean value of 0.009; this is comparable
with the findings of other studies, such as Kim et al. (2012) and Klein (2002).
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(0.119 and 0.126, respectively) relative to CSR firms that are not Shariah-compliant (0.100
and 0.098 respectively).15 In contrast, the mean of EQ1- for the CSR and Shariah-
compliant firms (-0.110) is lower than that for CSR firms that are not Shariah-compliant
(-0.103). The results show that in terms of the average scores for CSR, CSR and Shariah-
compliant firms have a mean value (0.788) that is higher than the CSR and non-Shariah-
compliant firms (0.633). These results indicate that the former are more likely to engage in
CSR activities. Moreover, the mean value of CG scores is higher for CSR and Shariah-
compliant firms relative to CSR firms that are not Shariah-compliant. In addition, Panel C
shows that CSR and Shariah-compliant firms are larger and have lower leverage and better
earnings performance than CSR firms that are not Shariah-compliant. Panel D shows that
94.57% (93.16%) of the CSR and Shariah-compliant firms (CSR and non-Shariah-
compliant firms) are audited by a Big 4 accounting firm.
Table 3 presents the pairwise correlation coefficients for the variables. The table shows that
all correlation values are below the critical value of 0.80.16 The result indicates that CSR is
significantly and negatively correlated with EQ1 at the 1% level. Therefore, firms with high
CSR scores are less likely to engage in earnings manipulation through the discretionary
accruals. We also observe that CSR is positively associated with CG. There is also a positive
correlation between CSR and Shariah. These findings indicate that Shariah-compliant firms are
more likely to engage in CSR activities. However, Shariah also correlates significantly and
positively with EQ1, which indicates that CSR Shariah-compliant firms are more likely to
engage in earnings manipulation than CSR firms that are not Shariah-compliant. We also
observe that CSR is positively (negatively) correlated with SIZE and LEV (MB, ROA, and
CLOSE).
4.2 Multivariate results
Table 4 presents the regression results for the earnings quality on the CSR. We represent
earnings quality with the EQ1, EQ1+, or EQ1-. The results show that there is a negative
association between CSR and EQ1. In particular, the estimated CSR coefficient is negative
(-0.049) and highly significant (p < 0.01), and it indicates that firms with a high CSR score
are less likely to manipulate earnings. We find similar results for the signed negative
(EQ1-) and positive (EQ1+) regressions. These results show that firms with a high CSR
score are less likely to engage in either income-decreasing or income-increasing earnings
manipulation. Our findings support hypothesis 1a that the link between CSR and earnings
quality is motivated by moral obligations. That is, the firms’ desire to be transparent and
trustworthy in order to serve the interests of all stakeholders motivates their CSR
engagement. This finding also supports the empirical results in Hong and Andersen
(2011) and Kim et al. (2012).
With respect to control explanatory variables, the results show that ROA and MB have
a significant and positive relation with EQ1 (0.111 and 0.005; p < 0.01 and p < 0.01,
respectively). These results show that firms with better earnings performance and higher
growth opportunities are more likely to engage in earnings manipulation. We also
15 The untabulated result shows that the mean value of discretionary accruals (DA) for CSR firms that are
Shariah-compliant (CSR firms that are non-Shariah-compliant) is 0.017 (0.006), which indicates that both sample
groups exhibit income-increasing accruals.
16 We also run the VIF factor to check for multicollinearity among the explanatory variables. The untabulated
results show that there are no VIFs above 2.0.
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observe that insider ownership (CLOSE) is significantly and positively associated with
EQ1 (0.031; p < 0.01), and it shows that the firms closely held by investors are more
likely to manage earnings through accruals. In addition, the coefficients for MB are
positively significant in the case of the EQ1+ model and negatively significant in the
Table 2 Descriptive statistics. The table reports the descriptive statistics for the variables used in our analysis.
The sample period is 2003 to 2013. The SD is the standard deviation. The N is the number of firm-year
observations. The definitions of the variables are in Appendix B
Panel A: Continuous variables of the full sample
Variable N Mean Median SD Min Max 25th Percentile 75th Percentile
EQ1 4781 0.106 0.055 0.146 0.000 0.991 0.019 0.127
EQ1+ 2569 0.106 0.051 0.157 0.000 0.991 0.015 0.123
EQ1- 2212 -0.105 -0.059 0.132 -0.929 0.000 -0.131 -0.024
CSR 4781 0.679 0.756 0.246 0.000 0.978 0.506 0.895
CG 4781 0.591 0.642 0.253 0.000 0.973 0.403 0.803
SIZE 4781 15.246 15.161 1.421 9.585 19.375 14.269 16.123
MB 4781 3.190 2.152 23.004 -390.814 1080.450 1.302 3.528
ROA 4781 0.056 0.050 0.097 -1.323 2.259 0.024 0.085
LEV 4781 0.254 0.238 0.174 0.000 2.280 0.136 0.355
CLOSE 4781 0.261 0.209 0.230 0.000 1.000 0.054 0.431
Panel B: Dichotomous variables of the full sample
Variable Frequency of 1’s % Frequency of 0’s %
Auditors 4474 93.58 307 6.42
Shariah 1418 29.66 3363 70.34
Panel C: CSR Shariah-compliant versus CSR non-Shariah-compliant firms
CSR Shariah-compliant firms CSR non-Shariah-compliant firms
Variable N Mean Median SD N Mean Median SD
EQ1 1418 0.014 0.000 0.201 3363 0.006 0.000 0.170
EQ1+ 1418 0.119 0.059 0.163 3363 0.100 0.053 0.137
EQ1- 748 0.126 0.056 0.178 1821 0.098 0.048 0.146
CSR 670 -0.110 -0.062 0.145 1542 -0.103 -0.058 0.126
CG 1418 0.788 0.858 0.184 3363 0.633 0.684 0.255
SIZE 1418 0.613 0.667 0.253 3363 0.581 0.632 0.252
MB 1418 16.127 15.896 1.200 3363 14.874 14.728 1.342
ROA 1418 2.723 2.133 2.697 3363 3.387 2.174 27.371
LEV 1418 0.062 0.054 0.079 3363 0.053 0.048 0.103
CLOSE 1418 0.209 0.211 0.109 3363 0.273 0.257 0.192
Panel D: Dichotomous variables: CSR Shariah-compliant versus CSR non-Shariah-compliant firms
CSR Shariah-compliant firms CSR non-Shariah-compliant firms
Variable 1’s 0’s 1’s 0’s
% % % %
Auditors 1,341 77 3,133 230
94.57 5.43 93.16 6.84
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case of the EQ1- model. These coefficients indicate that firms with better performance
and higher growth opportunities are more likely to engage in earnings manipulation
through accruals.
Table 5 presents the effect of the CSR and membership in a Shariah index on
earnings quality. Similar to the above results, the CSR coefficient is negative and
highly significant (-0.053; p < 0.01), which shows that CSR firms are less likely to
engage in earnings manipulation. However, the Shariah coefficient is positive and
highly significant (0.018; p < 0.01). This significance suggests that membership in a
Shariah index does not enhance the quality of financial reporting. These results show
that, whereas CSR is significant in constraining earnings manipulation, membership in
a Shariah index has the opposite effect. Hence, membership in a Shariah index might
serve as a legitimacy mechanism to conform to stakeholders’ expectations and does
not play an important role in ensuring the firms’ ethical practices. The regression
result for the signed discretionary accruals shows a positive and highly significant
coefficient (0.028; p < 0.01) for the EQ1+ model. This coefficient shows that
Table 4 The effect of CSR on earnings quality. This table presents the regression results for the effect of CSR on
earnings quality. All test statistics and significant levels are estimated based on the standard errors adjusted by a
two-dimensional cluster at the firm and year level. The definitions of the variables are in Appendix B
EQ1 EQ1+ EQ1-
Coeff. Coeff. Coeff.
(t-stat) (t-stat) (t-stat)
CSR -0.049*** -0.034* 0.067***
(-4.27) (-1.87) (4.81)
CG 0.031** 0.021 -0.044**
(2.35) (1.08) (-2.54)
SIZE 0.000 0.001 0.001
(0.21) (0.25) (0.67)
MB 0.000 0.000 -0.000
(0.82) (0.10) (-1.57)
ROA 0.118*** 0.116** -0.121***
(4.00) (2.43) (-3.67)
LEV -0.000 -0.003 -0.001
(-0.01) (-0.10) (-0.02)
CLOSE 0.031*** 0.022 -0.038***
(3.02) (1.52) (-2.69)
Auditors 0.007 0.007 -0.014
(0.64) (0.45) (-0.92)
Constant 0.127*** 0.111** -0.172***
(4.14) (2.39) (-4.13)
Country/ Industry/ Year effects Included Included Included
Adj. R2 0.141 0.120 0.199
F 19.836*** 10.382*** 11.812***
N 4781 2569 2212
The *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01% levels, respectively
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Shariah-compliant firms are more likely to engage in income-increasing accruals.
Consequently, our findings support the argument that membership in a Shariah index
is used only as a label and perception tool to attract investment and does not enhance
financial reporting. This is consistent with the view that the inclusion of a firm in the
index does not necessarily constitute a religious objective.
Further, we use the individual scores of each social (SOCI) and environmental
performance (ENVI) pillar as a proxy for CSR. These components have been highlighted
as important CSR aspects that might influence firms’ behaviors (Stanwick and Stanwick
1998; Snider et al. 2003; Lee 2008; Huseynov and Klamm 2012). In doing so, we re-
estimate our base regression models by replacing CSR with either SOCI or ENVI.
Table 6 shows that the coefficients for both SOCI and ENVI are negative (-0.044 and
-0.036 for SOCI and ENVI, respectively) and highly significant at the 1% level. These
results hold even after adding the Shariah index variable. Our results indicate that firms
Table 5 The effect of CSR and membership in a Shariah index on earnings quality. This table presents the
regression results for the effect of CSR and membership in a Shariah index on earnings quality. All test statistics
and significant levels are estimated based on the standard errors adjusted by a two-dimensional cluster at the firm
and year level. The definitions of the variables are in Appendix B
EQ1 EQ1+ EQ1-
Coeff. Coeff. Coeff.
(t-stat) (t-stat) (t-stat)
CSR -0.053*** -0.040** 0.068***
(-4.59) (-2.23) (4.87)
Shariah 0.018*** 0.028*** -0.006
(3.28) (3.39) (-0.87)
CG 0.031** 0.021 -0.043**
(2.32) (1.06) (-2.53)
SIZE -0.001 -0.002 0.002
(-0.80) (-0.74) (0.89)
MB 0.000 0.000 -0.000
(0.85) (0.12) (-1.57)
ROA 0.119*** 0.120** -0.121***
(4.07) (2.53) (-3.67)
LEV 0.007 0.011 -0.003
(0.40) (0.40) (-0.10)
CLOSE 0.031*** 0.022 -0.038***
(3.10) (1.57) (-2.71)
Auditors 0.006 0.004 -0.014
(0.49) (0.25) (-0.89)
Constant 0.148*** 0.137*** -0.179***
(4.72) (2.91) (-4.24)
Country/ Industry/ Year effects Included Included Included
Adj. R2 0.143 0.124 0.199
F 19.416*** 10.263*** 11.494***
N 4781 2569 2212
The *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01% levels, respectively
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with higher scores for social and environmental performance demonstrate lower degrees
of earnings management.
5 Additional analyses
5.1 Label vis-a-vis serious adopters of ethical codes
In this section, we empirically examine whether the firms use ethical and socially
responsible investments as a label to enhance their reputation or whether they do so
as serious adopters. To accomplish this examination, we classify firms into four
categories: (i) HCSR_Shariah: Shariah-compliant firms with a CSR mean above the
sample median, (ii) HCSR_Non-Shariah: non-Shariah-compliant firms with a CSR
mean above the sample median, (iii) LCSR_Shariah: Shariah-compliant firms with a
CSR mean below the sample median, and (iv) LCSR_Non-Shariah: non-Shariah-
compliant firms with a CSR mean below the sample median. Table 7 shows that
the HCSR_Non-Shariah coefficient is negative and highly significant (-0.017;
p < 0.01), whereas the LCSR_Shariah coefficient is positive and significant (0.015;
p < 0.05). These coefficients provide further support for the assertion that high CSR
firms that are not Shariah-compliant are less likely to engage in earnings manipula-
tion. In contrast, low CSR firms that are also Shariah-compliant are more likely to
manage earnings. Hence, we consider firms with a high CSR rating as serious
adopters of ethical codes, whereas firms with a high CSR rating and Shariah-
Table 6 Analysis based on CSR Pillars. This table presents the regression results for the effect of CSR Pillars on
earnings quality. The EQ1 is the absolute value of current discretionary accruals calculated with the modified
Jones model adjusted for performance; SOCI is the scores of ASSET4’s social pillar; ENVI is the scores of
ASSET4’s environmental pillar; Shariah is an indicator variable that that equals one if the firm is included in the
FTSE Shariah Europe Index, and zero otherwise. All test statistics and significant levels are estimated based on
the standard errors adjusted by a two-dimensional cluster at the firm and year level
EQ1 EQ1 EQ1 EQ1
Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff.
(t-stat) (t-stat) (t-stat) (t-stat)
SOCI -0.044*** -0.047***
(-4.00) (-4.31)
ENVI -0.036*** -0.038***
(-3.65) (-3.89)
Shariah 0.017*** 0.017***
(3.25) (3.14)
Controls Included Included Included Included
Country/ Industry/ Year effects Included Included Included Included
Adj. R2 0.140 0.140 0.142 0.141
F 19.831*** 19.785*** 19.410*** 19.352***
N 4781 4781 4781 4781
The *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01% levels, respectively
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compliant are more likely to use ethical codes as a label to manage their reputations
in order to attract investments.
5.2 Alternative EQ metrics
We also re-estimate the regression models with four alternative earnings quality
metrics in order to examine whether our results are robust to these different accruals
measures. First, we use the total discretionary accruals instead of the current discre-
tionary accruals in the modified Jones model adjusted for performance (EQ2). Second,
following DeFond and Subramanyam (1998), we use the absolute value of the
abnormal accruals (EQ3) in the modified Jones model without adjusting for perfor-
mance. Third, following Baxter and Cotter (2009), we use a modified version of the
Dechow and Dichev (2002) accruals estimation errors model (EQ4). And, the fourth
measure is based on the abnormal working capital accruals model (EQ5) introduced
by DeFond and Park (2001).
The number of observations used in each model varies owing to additional data
requirements for estimating the alternative metrics of accruals quality. In general, these
alternative tests yield the same results as those obtained using EQ1. Panel A of Table 8
shows that CSR has significantly negative coefficients in the regression models of EQ2
(-0.053; p < 0.01), EQ3 (-0.039; p < 0.01), EQ4 (-0.013; p < 0.05), and EQ5 (-0.010;
p < 0.05) that support the view of transparent financial reporting and moral obligations.
These coefficients indicate a positive relation between CSR and earnings quality. We
Table 7 Analysis based on label or serious adopters of ethical codes. This table presents the regression results
for the effect of label or serious adopters of ethical codes on earnings quality. The EQ1 is the absolute value of
current discretionary accruals calculated with the modified Jones model adjusted for performance; HCSRShariah
is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm has CSR mean above the sample median as well as it is Shariah-
compliant, and zero otherwise;HCSRNon-Shariah is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm has CSR mean
above the sample median and it is not Shariah-compliant, and zero otherwise; LCSRShariah is a dummy variable
that equals one if the firm has CSR mean below the sample median as well as it is Shariah-compliant, and zero
otherwise; LCSRNon-Shariah is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm has CSR mean below the sample
median and it is not Shariah-compliant, and zero otherwise. All test statistics and significant levels are estimated
based on the standard errors adjusted by a two-dimensional cluster at the firm and year level
EQ1 EQ1 EQ1 EQ1
Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff.
(t-stat) (t-stat) (t-stat) (t-stat)
HCSRShariah 0.010
(1.60)
HCSRNon-Shariah -0.017***
(-3.78)
LCSRShariah 0.015**
(2.05)
LCSRNon-Shariah 0.004
(0.86)
Controls Included Included Included Included
Country/ Industry/ Year effects Included Included Included Included
Adj. R2 0.138 0.139 0.138 0.137
F 19.701*** 19.824*** 19.724*** 19.683***
N 4781 4781 4781 4781
The *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01% levels, respectively
J Financ Serv Res
also use these alternative accruals metrics to examine the effect of membership in a
Shariah index on earnings quality. Panel B of Table 8 shows that the estimated
coefficients for Shariah are positive and significant in the case of EQ2 (0.013;
p < 0.05) and EQ4 (-0.009; p < 0.01); these are similar to the main analysis. These
coefficients show that membership in a Shariah index does not play a significant role
in ensuring the moral obligations of Shariah-compliant firms in terms of reporting high
quality earnings information.
5.3 Home-country characteristics
Home-country characteristics could also explain the variations in CSR engagement and
accounting practices (La Porta et al. 1998; Hofstede 2001; Hope 2003; Bushman et al.
2004; Jackson and Apostolakou 2010; e.g. Ioannou and Serafeim 2012; Atwood et al.
Table 8 Robustness analysis. This table presents the regression results for the effect of alternative earnings
quality metrics on earnings quality. EQ2 is the absolute value of total discretionary accruals calculated with the
modified Jones model adjusted for performance; EQ3 is the absolute value of abnormal accruals calculated with
the modified Jones model excluding ROA; EQ4 is the absolute value of the residuals calculated with the modified
Dechow and Dichev (2002) accruals estimation errors model; EQ5 is the absolute value of abnormal working
capital accruals calculated with the DeFond and Park’s (2001) model; CSR is the average scores of ASSET4’s
environmental pillar and social pillar; Shariah is an indicator variable that equals one if the firm is included in
FTSE Shariah Europe Index, and zero otherwise. All test statistics and significant levels are estimated based on
the standard errors adjusted by a two-dimensional cluster at the firm and year level
Panel A: The effect of CSR on alternative earnings quality metrics
EQ2 EQ3 EQ4 EQ5
Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff.
(t-stat) (t-stat) (t-stat) (t-stat)
CSR -0.053*** -0.039*** -0.013** -0.010**
(-4.38) (-2.94) (-2.01) (-1.96)
Controls Included Included Included Included
Country/ Industry/ Year effects Included Included Included Included
Adj. R2 0.098 0.110 0.144 0.083
F 13.091*** 10.352*** 11.405*** 7.432***
N 4781 4595 3824 4583
Panel B: The effect of CSR and membership in a Shariah index on alternative earnings quality metrics
EQ2 EQ3 EQ4 EQ5
CSR -0.056*** -0.039*** -0.013** -0.010**
(-4.61) (-2.96) (-2.01) (-1.96)
Shariah 0.013** 0.008 0.009*** -0.002
(2.13) (1.17) (2.92) (-1.16)
Controls Included Included Included Included
Country/ Industry/ Year effects Included Included Included Included
Adj. R2 0.099 0.110 0.147 0.083
F 12.807*** 10.091*** 11.168*** 7.314***
N 4781 4595 3824 4583
The *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01% levels, respectively
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2012). To ensure that our main results are robust, we consider two important institu-
tional factors: cultural values and market economics. Following the literature (Hope
2003; Kim and Kim 2010; Elshandidy et al. 2014), we use Hofstede’s cultural
Table 9 Analyses based on firms’ home-country characteristics. The CMEs represent coordinated market
economies for Continental Europe (Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Spain,
and Sweden); LMEs represent liberal market economies (United Kingdom). Differences are the coefficient
difference between CMEs and LMEs based on the Chow test. All test statistics and significant levels are
estimated based on the standard errors adjusted by a two-dimensional cluster at the firm and year level
Panel A: Hofstede’s cultural dimensions.
EQ1 EQ1
Coeff. Coeff.
(t-stat) (t-stat)
CSR -0.045*** -0.048***
(-3.87) (-4.20)
Shariah 0.018***
(3.38)
UA -0.004*** -0.004***
(-6.61) (-6.45)
IND -0.003*** -0.002***
(-3.44) (-3.24)
MAS 0.001** 0.001**
(2.34) (2.10)
PD 0.007*** 0.007***
(9.34) (9.19)
LTO 0.003*** 0.003***
(4.39) (4.01)
Controls Included Included
Industry/ Year effects Included Included
Adj. R2 0.132 0.134
F 20.887*** 20.363***
N 4781 4781
Panel B: Comparison between CMEs and LMEs.
EQ1
CMEs LMEs Difference CMEs LMEs Difference
CSR -0.027* -0.091*** -0.081*** -0.031* -0.093*** -0.057**
(-1.68) (-5.43) (-1.94) (-5.56)
Shariah 0.022*** 0.011 -0.005
(3.00) (1.49)
Controls Included Included Included Included
Industry/ Year effects Included Included Included Included
Adj. R2 0.138 0.196 0.141 0.197
F 10.791 20.065 10.548 19.388
N 2692 2089 2692 2089
The *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01% levels, respectively
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dimensions as additional determinants in the empirical analysis. Hofstede’s cultural
dimensions consist of (i) uncertainty avoidance (UA); (ii) individualism (IND); (iii)
masculinity (MAS); (iv) power distance (PD); and (v) long-term/short-term orientation
(LTO)17 (Hofstede 1991; Hofstede 2001). Panel A of Table 9 shows the regression
results of our model after controlling for the potential effects of Hofstede’s cultural
dimensions. In general, these results are consistent with those obtained in the main
analysis, that is, these results also support the view that the moral obligation in CSR and
confirm the insignificance of membership in a Shariah index in influencing the firms’
moral imperative.
Finally, we also include firms’ home-country characteristics based on the varieties of
capitalism perspective proposed by Hall and Soskice (2001). Hall and Soskice classify
countries into two distinct types of institutional economies: coordinated market econo-
mies (CMEs) that comprise Continental European countries and Japan where the orga-
nized interests such as business unions and associations play dominant roles in
coordinating economic activities, and liberal market economies (LMEs) that comprise
the United Kingdom and the United States where the market plays the dominant role.18
We therefore partition our sample firms into two groups: CMEs are firms publicly traded
in Continental European countries (Belgium, Demark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy,
Netherlands, Spain, and Sweden), and LMEs are firms traded in the UK. In Panel B of
Table 9, the CSR coefficient is negative and weakly significant for CMEs (-0.027;
p < 0.10), whereas it is negative and highly significant for LMEs (0.091; p < 0.01). In
the Chow test, the difference in the CSR coefficient between CMEs and LMEs (-0.081) is
significant at the 1% level. This result shows that CSR firms domiciled in LMEs are less
likely to manipulate earnings than those in CMEs; this is consistent with the results
reported in the research (Hong and Andersen 2011; Kim et al. 2012). However, the
Shariah coefficients are positive for both CMEs and LMEs but only highly significant
for the former. This result is also consistent with our previous findings and shows that for
both groups, the firms use membership in a Shariah index only as a legitimacy tool to
attract investment.
6 Conclusion
This study examines the effect of two sources of ethical principles, CSR and membership
in a Shariah index, on the quality of financial reporting. We expect that opportunistic
behavior or moral obligation drives the firms’ engagement in ethical activities. Our
empirical results show that firms engaging in CSR activities are less likely to manipulate
earnings. These results are robust when using each main component of CSR as well as
alternative earnings quality metrics. In contrast, membership in a Shariah index has the
opposite effect on earnings quality. This finding indicates that membership does not play
an important role in ensuring managers’ ethical behavior. This result supports the idea
that the current Shariah screening process does not fully conform to the underlying
17 The definitions of Hofstede’s cultural dimensions are in Appendix B.
18 CMEs are characterized by weak markets for firms’ control, ownership by large investors, long-term debt
finance, strong interfirm cooperation, and rather rigid labor markets, whereas LMEs are characterized by active
markets for control, dispersed ownership, equity financing, weak interfirm cooperation, and flexible labor
markets (Jackson and Apostolakou 2010; Munari et al. 2010).
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Islamic principles and concentrates primarily on negative screening rather than social
welfare and transparency.
Furthermore, the inclusion in a Shariah-compliant index plausibly results from
firms satisfying the screening criteria rather than from a conscious decision to conduct
business in a Shariah-compliant manner. Membership basically implies that the firms
do not do anything prohibited under Shariah law. Another plausible explanation for
the variance between the two ethical sources could be that CSR rating agencies
provide comprehensive details regarding CSR information that is relevant to investors
in assessing every aspect of the firms’ CSR performance. The Shariah screening
process, in contrast, is less transparent in that the process provides only the final
outcome without explaining in detail the aspects that affect the decision to include a
firm in, or exclude it from, the index. This in turn limits investors’ ability to track the
firm’s Shariah performance and to predict the possibility of its Shariah-compliance in
the future.
Finally, our study is subject to the following caveats. First, similar to the CSR scores
provided by CSR rating agencies, the possibility exists that corporate CSR scores might
not accurately provide insight regarding actual CSR engagement; therefore, this might
affect the CSR measurement. Second, our results could be interpreted with alternative
explanations. For example, firms with better quality financial reporting might be more
likely to engage in CSR or that a firm’s corporate governance might simultaneously
determine its CSR performance and the manager’s tendency to manipulate earnings.
Similarly, a firm’s decision to seek inclusion in the Shariah-compliant index might be the
result of worse earnings quality and hence, firms have a motivation to Bbond^ to stronger
ethical principles to attract more investment. Despite this limitation, our findings provide
a better understanding of corporate financial reporting practices and behaviors and the
ethical principles that are value based (i.e., related to religion). Thus, CSR might be of
interest to standard setters, regulatory bodies, investors, and academics involved in the
field of ethical and Islamic business. In particular, our study provides robust support for
the view that a moral imperative motivates firms to engage in CSR activities. We show
that an ethical obligation rather than managerial opportunism drives CSR. This finding
shows that CSR plays an important role in companies’ decisions. In addition, this study
shows the ineffectiveness of membership in a Shariah index in constraining opportunistic
behavior and enhancing the ethical codes for conducting business. Further research could
examine this issue by including the effect of other institutional factors on CSR and
religious moral codes. In addition, assessing the effect of CSR performance on the
quality of financial reporting by privately held firms could be an interesting avenue for
future research.
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Table 10 Description of Asset4’s
pillars and categories
Source: Thomson Reuters
Datastream
Pillars Categories
Economic performance Client loyalty
Performance
Shareholders loyalty
Environmental performance Resource reduction
Emission reduction
Product innovation
Social performance Employment quality
Health and safety
Training and development
Diversity
Human rights
Community
Product responsibility
Corporate governance performance Board structure
Compensation policy
Board functions
Shareholders rights
Vision and strategy
Appendix A
Appendix B
Table 11 Variable definitions
Variable Description Definition
EQ1 The absolute value of current
discretionary accruals
Discretionary accruals are calculated through the cross-sectional
modified Jones model adjusted for performance
CSR CSR scores The average scores of ASSET4’s environmental pillar and
social pillar
Shariah Membership in a Shariah index An indicator variable that equals one if the firm is included in
the FTSE Shariah Europe Index and zero otherwise
CG Corporate governance scores The scores of ASSET4’s corporate governance pillar
SIZE Firm size The natural logarithm of the market value of equity
MB Firm growth Market-to-book equity ratio measured as the market value of
equity divided by the book value of equity
ROA Profitability Measured as income before extraordinary items divided by
total assets
LEV Leverage Calculated as long-term debt scaled by total assets
CLOSE Ownership concentration The percentage of closely held shares as reported by Worldscope
Auditors Big4 auditors An indicator variable that equals one when a firm is audited by
a Big 4 auditor and zero otherwise
UA Uncertainty avoidance Society’s level of tolerance with uncertainty. A low uncertainty
culture indicates that a culture has more rules and standards
imposed on individuals
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